A nuclear North Korea

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 4 concerns the ‘second nuclear crisis’ from January 2002 to November 2009. It analyses how, during this time, North Korea’s weaponized nuclear ambitions would intensify owing to the collapse of the Agreed Framework, the arrival of the George W. Bush administration in the United States, and a resultant US retrenchment from multilateralism. Whilst North Korea would oscillate between delinquent and compliant behaviour during this period, its ultimate unwillingness to concede on its nuclear ambitions would further its delinquent actions. This chapter examines how, during the so-called ‘second nuclear crisis’, North Korea strategically deployed delinquent behaviour to fulfil two somewhat contradictory objectives: first, the normalization of relations with the United States and, second, the development of nuclear weapons. It highlights how, after North Korea self-declared its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003, it pursued nuclear development increasingly unabashedly, leading to its first nuclear test in October 2006. At the same time, the international community sought to induce North Korea into compliance with nuclear norms through offering concessions, most notably through the multilateral Six-Party Talks. Yet, these efforts failed, and North Korea would conduct its second nuclear test in May 2009.