Inching towards Sanctions

Abstract

Abstract This chapter analyses Security Council negotiations towards four key resolutions on sanctions between 2004 and 2006. It demonstrates that the external legitimation practice of ‘doing something’, even if it cannot be implemented, was central to these negotiations. Two years of intense negotiations over sanctions resulted in a partial arms embargo and targeted sanctions against only four individuals. The first two sanctions resolutions in 2004 were facilitated by text-based agreements, where Security Council members did not agree on the substance of the decision and instead found language they could agree on. This left Council members with divergent interpretations of what they had agreed to, and difficulties in following through on the threat of sanctions for non-compliance. It took until 2005 to authorize sanctions infrastructure in the form of a Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts. When issuing its report, the Panel of Experts recommended targeted sanctions against seventeen individuals, however, Security Council members could only agree on four individuals. China demonstrated audience sensitivity by blocking targeted sanctions in the Sanctions Committee but enabling them to pass in the Security Council where its actions had public scrutiny. A diplomatic cable from the time reports that China said it would be ‘unthinkable’ to block an otherwise unanimous resolution. Western states attempted to ‘do something’, however, the combined impact of sanctions resolutions on Darfur was minimal.