Racial Realism and Essentialism

Abstract

AbstractWhat is “racial realism”? I distinguish a taxon issue from a category issue. I take both issues to be about whether kinds are explanatory. Looking to biology, I argue that Racial Taxon Realism is clearly true. There are infraspecific kinds, differing in minor ways, that biologists often call “races”. These kinds are biologically explanatory in virtue of having part intrinsic and part historical essences This doctrine extends to humans. Turning to Racial Category Realism, I reject the objection that the alleged biological races are not “worthy of the name” ‘race’. The more serious objection is that the category Race is not explanatory. If it is not, it is in the same boat as the higher Linnaean categories. I argue that all of these categories are “minimally” explanatory in marking out, in a rough and ready way, levels in the taxon hierarchy.