How semi-parliamentarism can balance visions of democracy

Abstract

Abstract This chapter explores how semi-parliamentary systems can balance the competing democratic visions of simple and complex majoritarianism. It compares the institutional design of the seven semi-parliamentary cases (the Australian Commonwealth, Japan, and five Australian states) and positions these cases on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns in the period 1993–2018. The analysis shows how the separation of powers can balance the two democratic visions in ways that are unavailable under pure parliamentarism. In particular, semi-parliamentarism can empower voters to make a clear choice between competing cabinet alternatives (“identifiability”), while representing them fairly in issue-specific legislative decision-making (“legislative flexibility”). The chapter also conducts comparative analyses of legislative coalition-building in Australia and of legislative success rates under different forms of government. Finally, the chapter explores the relevance of these findings for the performance of democracies and discusses how semi-parliamentarism may complement other institutional designs, such as compulsory voting and weaker forms of judicial review.