Abstract
Abstract
This chapter takes up the one major task left over by Chapter 2. That is, it sustainedly defends the correlativity (or biconditional entailment) of claim-rights and duties against sundry criticisms marshalled by philosophers such as Joseph Raz, Jeremy Waldron, Neil MacCormick, and H.L.A. Hart. As the chapter shows, every one of those criticisms is either irrelevant or fallacious. The chapter also dismantles Nicolas Cornell’s attempts to maintain that legal or moral wrongs can be committed against parties who have not held any claim-rights to the non-occurrence of the actions or other events that are constitutive of the wrongs. In addition, the chapter explores further some of the aspects of logical quantification that were broached in the preceding chapter.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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