Abstract
AbstractHow is it that ‘She told me so’ is often a perfectly adequate defence of why a hearer believed a speaker? This chapter argues that the function of social norms of trustworthiness is to ensure that when a speaker commits to something, she has fulfilled or will fulfil her commitment. Thus, when these norms fulfil their function, hearers are entitled to segue directly from a speaker’s commitment to belief that her commitment will be fulfilled. The chapter develops this functionalist account, developing three senses (which build on each other) in which the normal response to a speaker is to trust her. Moreover, the kind of trust which is normal is that which follows the evidence and, perhaps surprisingly, it is also evidence-following trust that yields a distinctive kind of interpersonal value, in the context of trusting relationships. The trust which normally matters follows the evidence.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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