Predicative Hylomorphism in Metaphysics Z

Abstract

Abstract In Metaphysics Z Aristotle analyses the relation between matter and form using what this chapter calls predicative hylomorphism, according to which form is predicated of matter as a persisting and definite subject. The chapter contends that Metaphysics Z.1–16 are aporetic: these chapters set out various criteria for substantiality and in so doing reveal that nothing can jointly satisfy all the criteria and so succeed as primary substance. Aristotle’s treatment of matter as a subject and as a continuant through change undermines the substantiality of even Aristotle’s most promising candidate, substantial form. The chapter ends by gesturing towards a second unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem of substance in Z.17 and H.1–5, and finally towards a third and more satisfactory way to solve the problem in H.6 and Θ. The third scheme uses a different conception of matter and its relation to form, which the author calls genus-differentia hylomorphism. On this version of hylomorphism, the matter that constitutes the complex is an indefinite determinable which form differentiates into a definite individual thing, a primary substance.