Sorting phenomena into kinds

Abstract

Abstract This chapter fills in the details of the broadly inferentialist view of kinds introduced in Chapter 8. Namely, what holds together open-ended groupings of historically identified phenomena? To answer this question, the anti-foundationalist Neurathian strategy has to steer a clear path between two main philosophical views: essentialism and conventionalism. Section 9.1 lays the ground for the Neurathian strategy. Section 9.2 articulates some of the reasons for doing away with ‘deep essentialism’ about natural kinds. Section 9.3 starts from historicist criticisms of scientific realism and elaborates the particular brand of contingentism about kinds that I advocate here. Section 9.4 spells out the positive proposal of sorting phenomena into kinds. It sees natural kinds as sortal concepts, taking loosely inspiration from the way in which Spinoza originally envisaged the notion of a ‘sortal’. It reviews some of the recent literature in experimental philosophy and developmental psychology to elucidate how natural kinds qua sortal concepts can help us make sense of a wealth of studies concerning children’s acquisition of natural kind concepts. Section 9.5 answers the question of what holds open-ended groupings of phenomena together.