Disrupting the Federal Balance?

Abstract

Abstract This chapter deals with the impact of an activated Article 2 TEU on the Union’s federal balance. For one, the judicial enforcement of EU values in the Member States might be perceived as exceeding the Union’s competences or as affecting the Member States’ constitutional identities. Moreover, enforcing a uniform understanding of Article 2 TEU values might be normatively undesirable from a pluralist perspective and practically unattainable, considering the diversity among the Member States. Even if most of these objections can be refuted, they call for caution, especially when the provision’s Verbund dimension is concerned. The chapter examines various tools enabling judicial self-restraint, such as a minimalist reading of Article 2 TEU, the use of presumptions, and judicial deference. The latter includes not only a decentralized review leaving the final say on Article 2 TEU violations to referring courts but also a margin of appreciation doctrine.