The Limits of Transformational Authoritarian Constitutions

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers the shift from authoritarianism to constitutional democracy through the legacies of past constitutions. It reflects on how Indonesia arrived at this period of constitutional democracy by characterizing the country’s constitutional developments in five main stages: the first and second period of the revolution constitution (1945–1949; 1959–1999); the interim period of constitutional democracy (1949–1959); the first period of constitutional democracy under the amended 1945 Constitution (1999–2019); and the second period of tangible threats to and decline of constitutional democracy (2019–present). The chapter argues that Indonesia’s initial 1945 Constitution was a constitution co-opted by authoritarian rule. The amended 1945 Constitution is a transformational authoritarian constitution in the sense that constitution-makers took the framework of the authoritarian constitution and, through amendment, transformed its commitments to constitutional democracy. Yet there is the risk of reversion to some aspects of the initial 1945 Constitution, which shows the paradox at the heart of choosing a transformational authoritarian constitution, rather than drafting a new one.