The Compatibilist Spectrum

Abstract

Abstract Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility have proliferated and become more sophisticated to an astonishing degree in the last half of the twentieth century and into this century. The aim in this chapter is to discuss interesting patterns in this proliferation that throw further light on the view developed in this book and on debates about free will and responsibility in general. It discusses “hierarchical motivation” and “mesh theories” of compatibilist kinds inspired by Frankfurt, “reason views” and “reasons-responsive” compatibilisms of a variety of thinkers, Strawsonian compatibilist views, newer “dispositional compatibilist” views, and a newer “libertarian compatibilism.” Finally the chapter considers “revisionist views” which argue that since incompatibilist views are impossible, we must revise our views in a compatibilist direction. The chapter argues throughout that while many aspects of these compatibilist views must also play essential roles in any adequate libertarian view of free will, none can be the whole story.