Abstract
Abstract
This chapter isolates an often overlooked standard for assessing action: the standard of reasonableness. Reasonableness, in the ‘threshold’ sense described, is not a requirement of justification. Instead, it demands only that action be supported by sufficiently strong reasons, which may include defeated reasons. It is best understood as a requirement of ‘relativized justification’: to be reasonable is to be justified relative to some eligible view of the balance of reasons. The chapter explores which criteria might determine the eligibility of views of the balance of reasons, and how this can depend on the relations that hold between those assessing action and those whose actions are being assessed.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference26 articles.
1. Chang, Ruth (2016). ‘Comparativism: The Grounds of Rational Choice’. In Errol Lord and Barrie Maguire (eds), Weighing Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. What Makes an Administrative Decision Unreasonable?;The Modern Law Review,2021
3. The Mysterious Case of the Reasonable Person;University of Toronto Law Journal,2001
4. The Many Faces of the Reasonable;Law Quarterly Review,2015