The Right to (Robust) Privacy

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that the right to privacy is a right to a robustly demanding good (i.e., it has counterfactual or modal demands). When we enjoy the right to privacy, we enjoy an assurance that our privacy will be respected, not only here and now, but also in relevant possible worlds (e.g., independently of our income, or our political or religious views). In contrast, privacy is a good enjoyed thinly (i.e., in the here and now). That is, privacy and the right to privacy can come apart. One can have privacy and yet have one’s right to privacy violated. Conversely, one can have one’s right to privacy respected while losing privacy. Section 1 argues for the right to privacy as a robustly demanding good. Section 2 makes the point that rights that protect robust goods like privacy, democracy, and security share the same structure. Section 3 addresses the objection that this account is not parsimonious. Section 4 details what are the possible worlds that the right to privacy covers and what is meant by assurances that our privacy be respected. Section 5 clarifies the role of social norms in supporting privacy and the right to privacy. Section 6 explains why sensitive inferences violate the right to privacy, even when they turn out to be false. Section 7 argues that the right to privacy is a collective endeavour. Section 8 concludes the chapter with a summary.