Cyber-Enabled Subversion

Abstract

Abstract This chapter provides the first systematic examination of the role subversion has played in Russia’s “hybrid war” strategy short of war against Ukraine between 2013 and 2022. It evaluates and compares the use of both traditional means and cyber operations to achieve Moscow’s strategic goals. Traditional subversion produced some key successes, culminating in the annexation of Crimea. These successes provide further evidence of the importance of enabling conditions, foremost the extent of available vulnerabilities. Contrary to prevailing expectations about a revolution short of war enabled by cyber capabilities, however, cyber operations by and large fell short of producing measurable strategic value—both individually and cumulatively. In an interesting parallel to Czechoslovakia, the investigation of seven major Russian-sponsored cyber operations also shows an evolution from early daring experiments toward more prudent objectives and correspondingly increasing operational restraint. Strikingly, despite significant variation in the effects pursued across this evolution, the hacking group involved did not manage to escape the constraints posed by the trilemma. On the contrary, the findings indicate that the efforts to balance out the trade-offs involved ultimately led to strategic irrelevance—and a subsequent abandonment of cyber operations as means of active interference. In short, findings confirm the expected disadvantages of cyber operations while providing further evidence in support of the constraining role of the trilemma both in traditional subversion and in cyber operations. Accordingly, Russia’s hybrid war strategy of aggression short of war overall failed to achieve its goals.