Aristotle and the Later Fourth Century

Abstract

AbstractAristotle provides the only robust theory of sôphrosunê from the classical period, principally in Nicomachean Ethics 3.10–12, though with briefer versions in Eudemian Ethics and Magna Moralia. He argues that it amounts to moderation of some of the desires of touch, specifically those associated with nutrition and reproduction: food, drink (wine), and sex. He presents his analysis as deriving from ordinary language use, but by comparison with the uses of Sophocles (someone he read) and Isocrates (a contemporary), we see that it cannot. Instead, Aristotle’s theory of the virtue tracks his biology, psychology, and taxonomic aims, ensuring that each virtue has non-overlapping scope. Desire-control mostly gets shunted off to self-control, judgment about authoritative norms to practical judgment or wisdom. For Aristotle, sôphrosunê retains a basal role in maturity—it is a core precondition for rational agency—but it loses its position as a primary concept for thinking about human maturity. At chapter’s end we consider various Peripatetic and contemporary Academic accounts of sôphrosunê, noting their differences from Aristotle’s.