The Roots of Culpable Ignorance

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter explores the roots or origins of culpable ignorance. First, it spells out what culpability is. After that, a particular way is sketched of thinking about responsibility for belief and for ignorance, namely, the Influence View. On this view, we are responsible for our doxastic attitudes because of the influence we have on them via various belief-influencing actions rather than directly or indirectly controlling them (we normally cannot intentionally bring them about). Subsequently, the Influence View is contrasted with its two main rival views: doxastic compatibilism and attributionism. Next, the Origination Thesis is laid out, which is a particular view on the roots of culpable ignorance. The Origination Thesis is then qualified by showing that culpable ignorance has in fact three distinct roots or origins. Finally, the chapter elaborates on the ramifications of this particular view for various debates in philosophy, including the issue of whether culpable ignorance can excuse.