Asserting Ignorance

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter explores to what extent ignorance can be asserted. It first discusses whether one can express objectual and practical ignorance. It then investigates whether each of the six varieties of ignorance—disbelieving, suspending, undecided, unconsidered, deep, and complete ignorance—can be expressed. It also considers what adherents of the Standard View take to be an additional variety of ignorance, namely, unwarranted ignorance, and what adherents of Duncan Pritchard’s Normative View could call ignorance that issues from the violation of an obligation to inquire. It is argued that only two out of these six or eight kinds of ignorance are assertable and that the remaining varieties of ignorance are unassertable for rather different reasons. It is then explored whether this conclusion also holds for asserting group ignorance. Finally, this chapter discusses two ramifications of the thesis that some versions of ignorance can be asserted whereas others cannot: the debate about inexpressible ignorance and the Transparency View on self-knowledge.