Abstract
AbstractThe major choice points in the book are revisited, and alternatives to each of them are sketched. The alternatives either take the form of endorsing different principles in the formal languages adopted here, or of adopting different languages. Worries about the metasemantics of higher-order languages are addressed, and a methodology is advocated according to which the good standing of new ideological resources can be established through their successful use. The chapter concludes with two cautionary remarks: First, views of fine-grained individuation of propositions which are sometimes grouped under the umbrella term "hyperintensional metaphysics" may not in fact be able to make sense of the notion of hyperintensionality. Second, the difficulties in establishing that such views are viable is greater than is often appreciated, since showing their consistency by model-theoretic means requires models of our talk of propositions rather than merely models of the propositions themselves.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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