Abstract
AbstractThis chapter compares the plausibility of the account of aesthetic assertion offered thus far with that of the pessimist’s preferred account. It is argued that—as with the debates concerning appeal to cases in previous chapter—the pessimist’s position gains some initial attraction by focusing on a selective range of cases, but discussion of a full range of cases ultimately favours the optimist. The chapter also briefly considers, and rejects, some alternative explanations which a pessimist might offer for the impermissibility of the relevant assertions. Finally, some concluding remarks on the state of the dialectic between the pessimist and the optimist are offered.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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