Navigating ‘Freedom and Resentment’

Abstract

Abstract This chapter proposes that part of the explanation for the divergent interpretations of ‘Freedom and Resentment’ is that a variety of seemingly very different readings are genuinely grounded in the text. In particular, it is argued that key notions in Strawson’s account can be understood in different ways, including: his appeal to ‘the facts as we know them’, his contrast between the ‘objective’ and ‘participant’ views, his notion of ‘quality of will’, and his claim that the responsibility practices revealed and expressed by our reactive responses are neither capable of nor in need of justification. The chapter argues that our initial interpretation of an idea leads us down a path which puts the next idea in a particular light, but where a different starting interpretation could have led to an alternative picture, equally coherent and compatible with the text. Finally, the chapter evaluates how Strawson’s argument is affected by the fact that he does not define determinism, saying that he does not know what the thesis of determinism is. It is argued that his argument is compatible with very different understandings of determinism, with implications for the nature of the resulting compatibilism.