Abstract
Abstract
This final chapter provides a comparative analysis of the six countries and their sub-national cases, demonstrating the influence of both state infrastructural power and political contestation in the distribution of social transfers. Though the tendency of the policy literature on social protection has been to seek ways of de-politicizing implementation in order to promote impartiality, comparative analysis shows that in all cases, including where implementation is relatively impartial, politics plays an important role in shaping programme choices and outcomes. In general, high levels of infrastructural power are associated with more impartial implementation, albeit that the pursuit of productivist objectives in Ethiopia and Rwanda has undermined the programmes’ protective function. Meanwhile, political dominance tends to be associated with relative impartiality, while political competition does sometimes provide incentives for politicians to intervene in the distribution of social transfers to try to secure political advantage.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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