Abstract
Abstract
This chapter explores the ways that awkwardness acts as an impediment to moral discourse and action. The first part of the chapter argues that awkwardness inhibits us from engaging in moral criticism within interpersonal relationships. The chapter identifies a set of moral problems particularly prone to awkwardness—morally awkward problems. Awkwardness explains why, in many cases, people are hesitant to speak up about these issues. An obvious objection to this claim is that people criticize one another quite often, but in fact the type of criticism people engage in is limited. The second half of the chapter argues that awkwardness explains our unwillingness to act in bystander cases, and that this shows something about the inhibitory power of social uncertainty.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
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