Abstract
AbstractThe conclusion revisits the idea that metaphysicians cannot simply ignore questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science—these questions must be addressed directly. It then recaps the arguments for, consequences of, and concerns about methodological naturalism. It closes with a plea for further research into the extra-empirical aspects of theory choice in science––research that needs to be done jointly by philosophers of science, historians of science, and metaphysicians. Without this research, we cannot fully understand the potential implications of methodological naturalism on a wide range of philosophical debates. Nor can we decide, ultimately, whether to be methodological naturalists.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
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