Abstract
AbstractThis chapter considers the consequences of rejecting methodological naturalism and suggests that they would be just as widespread and dramatic as (though also quite different from) the consequences of accepting the view. As argued in Chapter 1, if we aren’t methodological naturalists, then we also should not be content naturalists. That is, we should not be concerned about potential conflicts between our favored philosophical theories and our best scientific theories. Although rejecting both content and methodological naturalism might seem initially attractive, since it would free metaphysicians to be more creative and innovative in their theorizing, it would also raise a host of difficult questions about the legitimacy and purpose of metaphysics. It is unclear what it means to say that metaphysicians are in the business of figuring out what the world is like, if conflicts with our best scientific theories are irrelevant.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
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