Informed Consent and Morally Responsible Agency

Abstract

Abstract Recently, there have been several illuminating discussions highlighting a connection between the appropriate conditions for morally responsible agency and for valid informed consent in health care (including for personal medical decisions and for participation in clinical trials). In this chapter, I begin by drawing parallels between debates in both areas (e.g. “substantive” versus “procedural” accounts, “capacity” versus “flow” accounts) and then briefly defend the idea that we should focus on a particular family of substantive views that appeal to high-enough quality opportunities for decision-making which are determined by both agents’ reasons-responsive capacities and situational factors. Notably, even if reasons-responsiveness conditions feature in both accounts of responsible agency and of informed consent, it remains an open question just how similar the conditions are in each area. In particular, since the basis for and the quality of our reasons-responsive capacities come in degrees, there is a question of when a threshold is met so that a person can be said to have a capacity, or a sufficiently high-quality capacity, which is a difficult question to answer in both realms. In this chapter, I assess possible answers and consider how constrained those answers should be by independent reasons to treat responsible agency and eligibility for informed consent similarly.