How to Settle Issues of Intentionality, and a Tentative Argument for Intentional Anti-Realism

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 2 discusses studies in experimental philosophy that purport to establish cultural diversity regarding questions such as “To whom does the name ‘Gödel’ really refer?” (as in Kripke’s Gödel–Schmidt thought-experiment). This discussion serves to elucidate the role of theoretical considerations in contrast with that of judgments over cases (the “method of cases”) in theorizing about intentionality and reference. It is argued that no theoretical considerations can settle questions of reference determination and that there can be no expertise in judgments of reference. This, then, suggests a tentative argument against the possibility of intentional states—one that shifts the burden of proof in the debate—and lays the ground for intentional anti-realism in general and for the practice-dependence view of the truth conditions of content ascriptions in particular.