Against Naturalistic Reductions of Intentionality

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 4 criticizes the very idea of a naturalistic reduction of intentionality. The chapter examines possible models for this approach. The first is the scientific model of reduction, as in the water–H2O case. It is argued that this model is inapplicable to the case of intentionality because in this case there is no analogue to the reduced macro property: we cannot identify an explanandum that can both be reduced to external relations and fit intentional realism. Second, the chapter attends to the conceptualist model, according to which it is the concept of intentionality (or of reference etc.) that determines some naturalistic relation as the intentional relation. It is argued that this option leaves aboutness out. A related argument against the very idea of naturalistic reductions of intentionality is then presented, according to which the difficulty of singling out the intentional relation among the many world–mind naturalistic relations is insurmountable.