Decomposing Humanity

Abstract

AbstractThe moral status of mature human persons entitles them to consensual relationships and to equal social status. This moral status is plausibly grounded in the possession of critical reason, and it contrasts with the most minimal moral status, which is grounded in consciousness. The latter entitles beings not to be harmed, but it does not entitle them to equal or consensual relations. The essay defends a moral status intermediate between these, one that entitles beings to intelligible relations: we must address ourselves to them and attend to how they understand their treatment. This does not entail consensuality. It does involve accountable relationships, but this is compatible with social hierarchy. Judgment, not critical reason, underlies the intermediate moral status, and so this intermediate status is distinct from that of mature human persons. There are at least three types of moral status, accordingly, and these constitute both a hierarchy and a developmental sequence.