Virtue, Luck, and Other Goods

Abstract

AbstractNagel labeled the question about demandingness “Williams’s Question.” In this chapter, the author tries to overcome the underappreciation of the historical aspects of the current debate on demandingness by arguing that pagan ancient ethics, which Williams considered to be an alternative to the modern morality system, can be very demanding, too. After clarifying his terminology and addressing alleged methodological obstacles, three previous interpretations are rejected, namely by Nagel, Raz, and Annas. The author then opposes the view that the main problem for ancient ethics is egoism by showing that classical virtue theories can be highly demanding precisely because of their views regarding personal well-being: a comparison between the Stoics and the Socratic-Platonic tradition, including a brief contrasting glance on Aristotle, will reveal that the demandingness of these theories depends on whether virtue is considered the only life-enhancing good or whether luck and other things have the status of goods. Ancient theories promote moral sainthood and can run into the same problems as Kantian or consequentialist theories, only for different reasons.