Abstract
Abstract
This chapter brings the preceding chapter’s issues into contact with questions and answers concerning the distinctive ways in which human selves are (and, against too facile presuppositions concerning autonomy, are not) bounded, relating this to a discussion of the ways in which human experience is, and instructively (again, against too facile empiricist presuppositions) is not, bounded. Questions of multiple versus singular interpretations, of art and of persons, are considered here, along with the sense of rightness (and wrongness) that can emerge in interpretive contexts. Lastly, the chapter discusses our descriptions of our own actions, the way that figures into self-description and self-understanding, and Virginia Woolf’s observations on the special difficulties of capturing in words the sensibility of the person to whom an event occurred.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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