De-idealization, mind, and language

Abstract

Abstract The first chapter of Nonideal Theory and Content Externalism (1) introduces de-idealizations as a kind of philosophical project, (2) makes a case for de-idealizations in philosophy of mind and language, and (3) responds to objections, including a recent argument that ideal/nonideal theory is useless in philosophy of language. To de-idealize a theory is to replace its model of society as free of oppression with a model that represents systemic oppression and its effects. The use of de-idealizations in mind/language is motivated in this chapter through the argument that (a) oppression systematically influences the parts of society that many theories of mind/language appeal to in their descriptions, explanations, and predictions, but (b) oppression has also made it so that most Western philosophers are ignorant of systemic oppression; consequently, (c) most theories of mind/language adopt systematically inaccurate social models and thus generate systematically inaccurate descriptions, explanations, and predictions. These theories should be de-idealized.