Applications

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers how the de-idealizations developed in earlier chapters might be useful beyond discussions of content externalism and methodology in the philosophies of mind and language, with a focus on discussions of epistemic injustice and conceptual engineering. With regard to epistemic justice, the chapter makes the case that (i) the de-idealizations provide reasons to adopt an expansive conception of hermeneutical injustice, and (ii) if such an expansive conception is adopted, then the arguments in this book should establish that hermeneutical injustice occurs systematically. Additionally, this book’s arguments suggest that not only are concepts “up to us” but so are the processes that determine concepts. Thus, this book raises new questions relevant to work on conceptual engineering. Conceptual engineers should not only ask “What should concepts be like?” but also “Who should determine concepts?” and “What should the processes that determine concepts be like?”