Tacit Consent and Attributed Consent

Abstract

AbstractLocke cemented the notion of tacit consent in political theory in his Two Treatises, but scholarly emphasis has been on the ‘consent’ rather than the ‘tacit’. As a form of silent performativity, Locke overlooks its unintentionality, contending that consent is signalled through ownership or utilizing public goods such as a highway. Yet politically silent people can move tacitly from ascribed consent to presumed non-consent simply by abandoning their territorial possessions and transferring their physical presence elsewhere. Locke’s tacit consent thus offers a political advantage: the freedom to enter or exit territories through a political inconclusiveness unburdened by the constraints of commitment induced by text or speech. That freedom is unavailable to those who have expressly consented. The political becomes a major exploiter of silence as its vehicle. Tacit consent is also evident in various marriage rituals in which unequal power exchanges occur. More recent instances of a ‘silent majority’ play prominent roles in political discourse carrying fantasies of control.