This book, based on a philosopher’s experiences as dean over almost two decades, argues it is appropriate for the sciences and humanities to have different aims and for the values informing their inquiries also to be different. It maintains there are four core differences: (1) it is proper for the sciences but not the humanities to seek insights not limited to particular locations, times, or things; (2) the sciences but not the humanities value findings as independent as possible of the perspectives of the inquirers; (3) the sciences should be wholly descriptive while the humanities can also be concerned with prescriptive claims, which give expression to values; and (4) the sciences are organized to increase collective knowledge, whereas in the humanities individual insight is highly valued independently of its ability to generate consensus. Associated with these differences are secondary distinctions: different attitudes about an endpoint of inquiry; different notions of intellectual progress; different roles for expertise; different assumptions about simplicity and complexity; and different approaches to issues associated with consciousness. Taken together these distinctions constitute an intellectual geography of the humanities and sciences: a mapping of key features of their epistemology. In addition, the book discusses the role of universities in an era attached to sound bites and immediately useful results, and the importance of there being a healthy culture of research for both the sciences and humanities, one that treasures long-term intellectual achievements and whose presiding value is that with respect to many issues it ought not to be easy to have opinions.