MAD and Taboo: US Expert Views on Nuclear Deterrence, Coercion, and Non-Use Norms

Abstract

Abstract This research note reports views on nuclear deterrence, coercion, and non-use norms from surveys of 320 current and former US national security officials and 1,303 US-based international relations scholars. It finds that both groups hold relatively optimistic views on these key issues. Majorities express confidence that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence, but are skeptical that a nuclear arsenal can translate into coercive foreign policy success. Respondents are also confident that the nuclear taboo constrains countries from using nuclear weapons in a first strike, but the intensity varies by the country in question. Although limited, the results demonstrate overlap between academics and policymakers on key nuclear concepts. To the extent that experts hold these topline nuclear views that can influence their decision-making, teaching, and research. The results also point to a common tension in thinking about deterrence against conventional attack and norms constraining nuclear first use.