Lie–truth judgments: adaptive lie detector account and truth-default theory compared and contrasted

Abstract

Abstract Two contemporary theoretical perspectives explain when and how people make lie–truth judgments. The adaptive lie detector account (ALIED) and truth-default theory (TDT) are described, compared, and contrasted. ALIED and TDT come from different scholarly traditions and propose very different processes and mechanisms, yet they converge on many behavioral predictions. Both views presume adaptive processes. ALIED presumes that humans are adaptive by using available information while TDT presumes that the adaptive value of efficient communication outweighs the value of real-time deception detection. ALIED proposes a Bayesian reasoning approach to lie–truth judgments that weighs information based on its perceived diagnosticity, making no distinction in the processes between reaching a lie and truth judgment. TDT alternatively proposes that the passive presumption of the truth is the default, and the presence of triggers is required to reach a lie judgment. Suggestions for future research are provided.