Abstract
I analyze a model of electoral competition with entry under the run-off rule. I consider both two- and multiple-party systems. The principal result is that two-party systems may prove stable under the run-off rule: I show that a continuum of equilibria exists in which only two parties enter and subsequent entry is deterred. This finding conflicts with the accepted wisdom on the run-off rule encapsulated by Duverger's Hypothesis. The results of the model are then reconciled with Duverger's Hypothesis and a more precise formulation is proposed.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science
Reference60 articles.
1. I have focused here on symmetric equilibria. The logic of Proposition 7 does not depend on the dominant parties locating symmetrically. A complete characterization of equilibria, both symmetric and asymmetric, is possible but would not add substantively to the results and has therefore been omitted.
2. The Reaffirmation of a Multiparty System in France
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