Why Costly Rivalry Disputes Persist: A Paired Conjoint Experiment in Japan and South Korea

Abstract

Abstract The literature suggests that voters have a self-centered incentive to call for the de-escalation of conflicts that inflict economic costs on them, which explains why economic sanctions and trade wars often lose popular support when the resulting cost for the domestic economy rises. It is thus puzzling why some costly disputes between two advanced democracies are prolonged. Taking a psychological approach, we argue that nonviolent yet costly disputes between international rivals can fail to de-escalate because the perception of loss invokes anger and risk-taking attitudes. We test our argument using a paired conjoint experiment involving Japan and South Korea. We find that, in both countries, the public becomes more defiant and less supportive of de-escalating an ongoing dispute when informed about (1) the high cost of the trade restrictions on domestic firms, (2) international (i.e., World Trade Organization) support for the rival country, and (3) the rival public's hardline stance on the dispute. These findings lend support to our psychological explanation.