Who Securitizes? Climate Change Discourse in the United Nations

Abstract

AbstractWhen and why do states reframe issues as security problems? Which states advocate for these shifts? While securitization theory predicts that states that are existentially threatened by a problem are most likely to attempt to securitize it, I argue that accounting for the dynamics of institutional agendas can better explain this phenomenon. States that stand to gain agenda control as a result of securitization are likely to rhetorically attempt to securitize, while those that are materially interested in the issue are less likely to do so. I test this theory in the case of the climate change in the United Nations, leveraging data on speeches in the General Assembly. I provide the first quantitative test of the securitization of climate politics, finding that P5 states securitize to expand their agenda control, while Small Island Developing States do not securitize, contra previous expectations. I further find that the overall climate discourse cannot be characterized as securitized. These findings imply that the Security Council is unlikely to be significantly involved in climate change policy and also demonstrate the importance of rhetoric for political outcomes and for the distribution of state power within international organizations.