Agile predators: private equity and the spread of shareholder value strategies to US for-profit colleges

Abstract

AbstractI argue that growth in private equity and publicly traded ownership of US for-profit colleges has created new shareholder-value pressures for schools to maximize returns for investors. Privately held firms, which had long dominated the sector, were converted to private equity ownership through 88 buyouts since 1987. Private equity managers then used IPOs to establish 20 of 35 publicly traded firms that operated in the sector. I use longitudinal panel analyses of 14,212 federally qualified colleges to show that schools under these ownership forms featured unusually high debts and low graduation rates for students. The results (a) provide some of the most robust evidence to date that shareholder value strategies of cost-cutting and implicit contract violations can adversely affect non-labor stakeholders; and (b) help to theorize the growing but understudied role of private equity as a transitional ownership form that spreads shareholder value strategies to privately held firms.