Affiliation:
1. Leiden University , The Netherlands
2. University of Leuven , Belgium
Abstract
Abstract
Since independence, Nigeria has adopted federalism to manage the country’s deep ethno-regional divisions, but federalism has not averted instability and return to military rule in the past. This highlights the need for additional factors and mechanisms to secure and stabilize civilian rule in Nigeria. The country’s ethnic party ban ensures that parties in power have a broad basis across the territory. Theoretically, these “integrated” parties are often argued to foster intergroup compromise and political stability. Yet in our case study of intergroup relations in Nigeria’s National Assembly, we demonstrate that the country’s broad-based parties do not play a strong role in organizing intergroup cooperation. Despite this, the Assembly has not experienced substantial policy gridlock. We argue that instead of integrated parties, ethno-regional balancing (i.e., a practice whereby key positions in parliament are allocated to different groupings) is a much more important stabilizing factor in Nigeria’s federal parliament.
Funder
Catharine van Tussenbroek Foundation
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Public Administration,Sociology and Political Science
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