Affiliation:
1. University of Gothenburg , Sweden
Abstract
Abstract
I offer an account of normative belief designed specifically for relaxed realists. This proposal not only gives relaxed realists an explicitly robust account of normative belief but also distinguishes their theory from related theories, notably quasi-realist ones. In doing so, it addresses a dilemma raised in the literature against relaxed realist theories.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Reference50 articles.
1. Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truthmaking, and Ontological Cheating;Akhlaghi;Ethics,2022
2. Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy;Bealer,1998
3. Expressivists Should be Reductive Naturalists;Bex-Priestley
4. Essays in Quasi-Realism
5. Ruling Passions