Abstract
Abstract
This article critically discusses the latest reform of the Greek administration system, which took the form of an Act establishing an “executive state.” It intends to make two contributions to the existing literature. First, it offers a critique of the executive state. Existing critiques generally focus on the bureaucratic concentration of powers in the office of the Prime Minister or the abandonment of positive elements found in previous reform attempts. However, they largely accept the reform as a technical response to the crisis. In contrast, this article presents a comprehensive critique that fully addresses the historic origins and contemporary significance of the notion and institutional forms of the executive state, revealing it as a political, rather than technical, measure that reflects deeper views about the relationship between the state, the economy, and society. Additionally, the article assesses the two main effects of this administrative reform—the centralization and depoliticization of policymaking—as manifestations of an authoritarian shift. The second contribution concerns the literature on authoritarian liberalism, which examines the authoritarian tendencies inherent in liberal forms and ideals. While several authors have explored the authoritarian tendencies of institutional reform in the face of crisis, this article seeks to explore the authoritarian phenomenon as part of a process of market capture and to examine its effects specifically on administrative law and structures. Ultimately, this article argues that administrative reform in Greece follows a rather sinister genealogy, and must be understood as an essential counterpart to the generalized and sustained attack on social and political rights following the dictates of the market.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)