Abstract
Abstract
Constitutional ideologies shape constitutional discourse, determining, at the extreme, what can and cannot be argued within constitutional institutions, or, more moderately, what can be argued but at a reputational cost. Treating constitutions as ideological devices allows us to construct constitutional models which begin with the standard rule-based account but build on this to show the rules combining to present a picture of reality, a worldview, that those within constitutional institutions are required to embrace. This worldview is dependent upon constitutional rules, but its significance extends beyond them, shaping how members of the state understand the world around them and, just as importantly, how they understand themselves. Constitutional ideology is inherently important, providing a lens through which we can examine the operation of institutions and discourse, but is also a powerful analytical tool that facilitates engagement with questions of citizenship, authority, attachment, and, perhaps most importantly of all, identity. This article provides a model of constitutional ideology, examining the interplay of rules and concepts, and the ways in which ideology structures reasoning. It concludes by outlining the types of ideological rules found in constitutional institutions. Rules relating to causality, end-states and values, empirical propositions (including historical claims), and claims about persons can all form parts of the state’s constitutional ideology.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)