Affiliation:
1. Associate Professor in International Human Rights Law, University of Oxford , Oxford , United Kingdom
Abstract
Abstract
This article explores what we call feminist constitutionalism and what should be called feminist constitutionalism. It argues that feminist constitutionalism, properly understood, is a discourse in contestation and the competing substantive arguments that define such contestation. A study in feminist constitutionalism would revolve around unraveling this discourse rather than categorizing or labeling particular constitutional texts or judicial outcomes as feminist. The article thus interrogates the current impulse to brand a recent spate of good outcomes by the Supreme Court of India as conclusively feminist, against a long trajectory of gender jurisprudence which brings out a rich and complicated history which can neither be simply cast aside nor celebrated. The only way to make sense of the practice of feminist constitutionalism is thus to study the discourse itself. The article shows the kind of discourse analysis which may lend itself to feminist constitutionalism.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Cited by
5 articles.
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