Constitutional civil–military dynamics in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Abstract In Thailand, Indonesia, and Myanmar, the military’s participation in politics and governance remains commonplace. These militaries occupy bureaucracies, manage elections, and occasionally even oust governments. Yet, these militaries are not rulers with iron fists: they never fail to adopt or participate in the drafting of constitutions, and constantly appeal to political actors embodying non-democratic notions of legitimate rule for support. So why do these militaries do so, and how do those constitutions affect their participation in politics thereafter? This article explores the relationship between militaries, legitimate rulers, and constitutions in Southeast Asia. It finds that constitutions are adopted to formalize political bargains between militaries and legitimate rulers, and that those constitutions then shape the militaries’ role in politics according to their provisions until political circumstances fundamentally change. The constitutional civil–military dynamic identified herein complements existing accounts in civil–military relations and comparative constitutional scholarship, by showing how constitutions can affect the militaries’ political role in non-democratic regimes.