Affiliation:
1. School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham , Birmingham B15 2TT, U.K
Abstract
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that, insofar as we doubt the bivalence of the Continuum Hypothesis or the truth of the Axiom of Choice, we should also doubt the consistency of third-order arithmetic, both the classical and intuitionistic versions.
Underlying this argument is the following philosophical view. Mathematical belief springs from certain intuitions, each of which can be either accepted or doubted in its entirety, but not half-accepted. Therefore, our beliefs about reality, bivalence, choice and consistency should all be aligned.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Philosophy,General Mathematics
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