Affiliation:
1. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford , Oxford OX2 6GG, U.K
Abstract
Abstract
Gödel argued that the incompleteness theorems entail that the mind is not a machine, or that certain arithmetical propositions are absolutely undecidable. His view was that the mind is not a machine, and that no arithmetical propositions are absolutely undecidable. I argue that his position presupposes that the idealized mathematician has an ability which I call the recursive-ordinal recognition ability. I show that we have this ability if, and only if, there are no absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions. I argue that there are such propositions, but that no recognizable example of one can be identified, even in principle.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Philosophy,General Mathematics
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