Abstract
Abstract
This article sets out a forward-looking account of moral responsibility on which the ground-level practice is directly sensitive to aims such as moral formation and reconciliation, and is not subject to a barrier between tiers. On the contrasting two-tier accounts defended by Daniel Dennett and Manuel Vargas, the ground-level practice features backward-looking, desert-invoking justifications that are in turn justified by forward-looking considerations at the higher tier. The concern raised for the two-tier view is that the ground-level practice will be insufficiently responsive to the forward-looking aims that are held to justify it. On the single-tier alternative, forward-looking considerations can more readily motivate substantial revisions, which the practice, due to serious and pervasive deficiencies, requires.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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2. Functions;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10
3. Asymmetries;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10
4. Introduction;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10
5. List of Tables;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10