Why Governments Have Their Troops Trained Abroad: Evidence from Latin America

Abstract

Abstract Why do governments send their soldiers abroad for military training? Governments frequently expose their troops to training offered by other countries, although this may undermine military control and even lead to coups. Focusing on the demand side of security assistance, I argue that governments accept these costs to achieve diplomatic and military goals. Governments first send some soldiers abroad to substantiate their cooperation with the host country. Once this diplomatic commitment is made, governments increase training rates to counter threats using military skills unavailable at home. I test both arguments by studying training patterns at the most notorious US training facility: the School of the Americas. Using original data based on more than 60,700 course attendance records between 1946 and 2004, I find support for the proposed diplomatic and military logics of foreign training. Governments were more likely to send soldiers to the school after they had aligned their foreign policy with that of the United States, and only increased training in response to insurgent attacks. The findings demonstrate why and when governments are willing to cede significant parts of their political power to foreign-trained soldiers and other states. This has important implications for understanding military effectiveness and security cooperation.